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that this seems to contradict a crucial premiss of the argument that McGinn
and others find in 2.0211–2.0212. On McGinn’s gloss, the argument presup-
poses that if aRb is false, then F(A) will lack sense—precisely the opposite of
what 3.24 openly declares.
One way to solve this difficulty, put forward by David Pears, is to appeal to
what he calls the Principle of Representation—the claim that the sense of prop-
ositions is ultimately grounded in a more fundamental correlation between
names and their referents. This enables Pears to argue that even if the sentence
at 3.24 holds for unanalysed propositions, there has to be a level of analysis at
which it does not hold—a level at which a proposition would not have sense
unless the elements of the proposition were correlated with existing objects. I
do not want to assess this move. The only point I want to make is that the
move is not available to McGinn. For ascribing to Wittgenstein Pears’s Princi-
ple of Representation would amount to abandoning her view on the relative
priority of the sense of propositions and the reference of names. The move is
only available to advocates of the metaphysical reading. But then McGinn
needs to provide alternative support for attributing to Wittgenstein the princi-
ple that if aRb were false F(A) would lack sense, as required by the reading of
2.0211–2.0212 that she endorses, given that, as he makes clear at 3.24, Wittgen-
stein does not think that the principle follows from our understanding of
propositions about complexes.
Overall, this is a highly rewarding book, and a welcome addition to the lit-
erature on the early Wittgenstein. It fills an important gap by providing a
systematic presentation and defence of an influential interpretative line that
had not received this level of attention before. Many aspects of this reading
receive strong support from McGinn’s book, even if, perhaps inevitably, some
of its weaknesses are exposed in the process.
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Stephen Mulhall’s new book presents the first sustained attempt at offering a
‘resolute’ reading of Wittgenstein’s opus magnum, the Philosophical Investiga-
tions. In this respect the focal points of Mulhall’s work are both the mature
Wittgenstein’s philosophical method and practice generally conceived as well
as the sections of the Investigations commonly referred to as ‘the private lan-
guage argument’, which Mulhall regards as an ‘illuminating test-case’ (p. 11) for
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his kind of interpretative strategy. To date, ‘resolute readings’ have mainly been
the province of early Wittgenstein scholarship: Cora Diamond and James Con-
ant first pressed such readings into service in an attempt to save the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus from ending in self-contradiction. By thus widening the
field of application, Mulhall has broken new ground for this sort of interpreta-
tion. Inevitably, he has also imported, along with the virtues, some of this
strategy’s inherent problems.
It is characteristic of ‘resolute’ readers that they ascribe to early Wittgen-
stein, and themselves accept, nonsense monism: ‘from the point of view of
logic, mere nonsense is the only kind of nonsense there is’ (p. 2), where ‘mere
nonsense’ just means plain gibberish. If a string of signs turns out to be non-
sensical, this is solely due to the fact that we have not assigned meaning to it; it
is not the result of a violation of the rules of logical syntax (p. 5) or of a ‘clash’
between intelligible components put together in an unintelligible way (p. 9).
Hence, there is nothing we ‘cannot do’ in the Tractatus: ‘the limits of sense are
not limitations’ (p. 8) fencing us off from the ineffable. Consequently, accord-
ing to resolute readers, Wittgenstein’s ‘ladder’ must be thrown away, not
because it has provided us insight into unstateable metaphysical truths, but
simply because the ‘perspective’ we thought we could occupy is shown to be
no more than the projection of an ‘illusion of sense’—the work’s putative ‘sub-
stantial claims’ reveal themselves to be plain, not ‘illuminating’, nonsense, once
Wittgenstein’s therapy has worked its magic on us.
The interpretative challenge of Mulhall’s book is to motivate the idea that in
the Investigations, too, it is possible to distinguish between ‘substantial’ and
‘resolute’ readings of it. Prima facie this is not an easy task, as the later Witt-
genstein does not present his reader with a Tractatus-type exegetical conun-
drum: the Investigations does not declare itself, like the Tractatus, to be
nonsensical. But if not, what are the merits of reading Wittgenstein’s later work
in ‘resolute’ fashion?
Mulhall (p. 9) takes his interpretative cues for promoting a ‘resolute read-
ing’ of the Investigations from two sections. 
The great difficulty here is not to represent the matter as if there were something one
couldn’t do. (§374)
When a sentence is called senseless, it is not as it were its sense that is senseless. But a
combination of words is being excluded from the language, withdrawn from circu-
lation. (§500)
If we do not heed Wittgenstein’s warnings here, Mulhall argues, while at the
same time regarding his notion of ‘grammar’ as a ‘way of recalling us to the
distinction between sense and nonsense’ (ibid.), then we might be tempted to
give this a ‘substantial’ spin; we might end up regarding grammar, like logical
syntax in the Tractatus, as prohibitive and as preventing us from articulating
something that is, nevertheless, in some sense, perfectly intelligible. So we
might be seduced into thinking that we can get intimations of what lies
beyond the limits that grammar has demarcated.
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I believe this problem to be spurious. If grammar sets limits to sense, then
there is indeed nothing—no thing—that lies beyond these limits and hence
there is, in this sense, nothing (no thing) one cannot do. The rules of gram-
mar, just as the rules of logical syntax in the Tractatus, are constitutive rules,
so what they rule out is a fortiori not something that could be done, but that
should not be done. (For a forceful articulation of this point, see Peter
Hacker, ‘Was He Trying to Whistle It?’, in Alice Crary and Rupert Read (eds),
The New Wittgenstein, London: Routledge, 2000. See also my A Confusion of
the Spheres, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, Ch. 3.) Anyone who
thinks otherwise has not understood what it means to be a condition of sense.
Hence, if endorsement of this muddled view is supposed to be a characteristic
feature of ‘substantial’ readings of the Investigations, one wonders who could
possibly be a proponent of them. To his credit, Mulhall does not actually sad-
dle anyone in particular with this conception.
More promising might be the thought that ‘substantial readings’ of the
Investigations involve attributing to Wittgenstein an ‘implicit philosophical
theory of the (now grammatical) conditions of sense—quite as if our everyday
abilities to distinguish sense from nonsense require at the very least a philo-
sophical grounding or foundation (perhaps a criterial semantics, or a theory of
language-games, or an anthropology of the human form of life)’ (p. 9). There
certainly are philosophers who ascribe just such views to Wittgenstein and
who are puzzled by the very idea of not advancing theses in philosophy. Never-
theless, there is also a long line of distinguished Wittgenstein scholars who are
very far indeed from doing this, but who would not accept a ‘resolute’ reading
of the Investigations. It would, I think, strengthen the case for ‘resolution’ if,
instead of being offered as an antidote to a ‘substantial’ conception, it were
rather to engage with the kinds of reading that—while not qualifying as ‘reso-
lute’—would also reject both conditions necessary for counting as ‘substantial’
(i.e. readings that would neither ascribe a theory to Wittgenstein nor regard
the limits of sense as limitations). There are more than just two alternatives
here.
These problems are compounded by the fact that the meaning of ‘substan-
tial’ itself seems to shift throughout Mulhall’s text. That is to say, as we read on
beyond the introduction, it becomes clear that a ‘substantial’ reading of the
Investigations is not just a conception that has succumbed to what I have called
the ‘spurious’ error above, or one that attributes some form of theory to
Wittgenstein—no, it seems to comprise any reading (including Mulhall’s own
from ‘pre-resolute’ times!) that regards Wittgenstein as advancing a non-
empty view, or some form of argument. For example, any reading of Wittgen-
stein’s famous ‘private diarist’ passage (§258) that attempts to show that ‘pri-
vate ostensive definition’ is logically impossible is characterized as ‘substantial’
by Mulhall. For, according to a ‘resolute’ reading, this passage ‘does not show
us that something (noting the occurrence of our pains) is logically impossible
in the kind of context the diarist stipulates; it shows us that, although we
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thought that we were imagining someone noting the occurrence of his sensa-
tions, we were not imagining anything … Wittgenstein’s aim is to get us to see
that ‘the tale of the diarist’ amounts only to someone making a mark, or utter-
ing an inarticulate sound’(p. 99). But, surely, if Wittgenstein is right, and ‘pri-
vate ostensive definition’ is logically impossible, then it just follows from that
that all the ‘private diarist’ is doing is, in the end, nothing in particular (for
what he claimed to be doing, is not, in fact, possible). So, the ‘substantial’
reader’s conclusion does not, in this respect, differ from the ‘resolute’ one. But,
if so, why prefer ‘resolution’?
Mulhall anticipates this type of objection on p. 82 and responds: ‘if one’s
interlocutor is convinced that her empty words articulate an insight, then sim-
ply to oppose or dismiss them (by directly invoking a grammatical articulation
that they appear to violate) would fail to acknowledge the fact that she will
necessarily respond to that invocation from within her conviction’ (p. 83).
Such a response would, in other words, fail to take the interlocutor seriously as
a subject. This is not convincing, however, for no proper Wittgensteinian phi-
losopher would go about attempting to defuse a philosophical position by just
quoting chapter and verse of grammar. In fact, this charge would be an espe-
cially unfair characterization of what Mulhall’s former self was about in On
Being in the World (London: Routledge, 1999). So, again, there seems no good
reason here to prefer a ‘resolute’ reading.
Perhaps the only imaginable selling-point of a ‘resolute’ reading is the fact
that it is genuinely difficult to understand the role of reductio ad absurdum
arguments (in the sense of arguments that reduce, quite literally to absurdity,
not contradiction) in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. For, as Mulhall asks,
How could any reductio argument deliver a genuine conclusion, by revealing the
sheer nonsensicality of its apparent starting-point? And if reductio arguments really
are legitimate means for gaining intellectual insight, then the position in which they
leave us is surely no more uncomfortable than that offered to us by the Tractatus,
with its concluding claim that a criterion for understanding its author is the realiza-
tion that every elucidatory word of his must be recognized as simply nonsensical—
as simply to be thrown away. Perhaps, when our concern is with the limits of sense,
there is no other way of acknowledging them, and of inviting others to share that ac-
knowledgement. And perhaps it is a criterion of properly understanding our diffi-
culties here that we apprehend the latent nonsensicality of the previous sentence …
No doubt, our false sense of understanding here was undergirded or encouraged by
Wittgenstein’s use of the word ‘beetle’ in articulating his putative analogy to a fanta-
sy about ‘pain’ and pain—as opposed, say, to ‘brillig’, or ‘$%&’, or ‘*’. (p. 137)
Although I agree with Mulhall that this may stand in need of further clarifica-
tion, I do not believe that a satisfactory response to this problem can be just to
write off as plain nonsense both what Wittgenstein says in such passages as
well as everything we say about what Wittgenstein is up to in such remarks.
But I do not see how this unpalatable consequence can be avoided if the fan-
tasy about ‘pain’ is really no different, as Mulhall says, from ‘$%&’, for, if so,
then our articulation of that fantasy will also turn out to be ‘$%&’—a fact that
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Mulhall seems to be acknowledging when he says that we must ‘apprehend the
latent nonsensicality of the previous sentence’. Given that the fantasy about
‘pain’ pervades much of Mulhall’s text, however, it will not just be the ‘previ-
ous sentence’ mentioned in the passage that will reveal itself to be sheer non-
sense, but significant parts of the book.
All of that said, there is also much in this work that is genuinely thought-
provoking. For example, in a short chapter entitled ‘Wittgenstein’s Semi-
colon’, Mulhall reminds us of an important bit of punctuation that has gone
missing in Anscombe’s translation of §255 of the Investigations: ‘The philoso-
pher treats a question; like an illness’, which Anscombe renders as ‘The
philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness’. Mul-
hall is right that Anscombe’s translation, however natural, ‘fails to do justice to
the concision and multivalence of the German original’ (p. 89); he further sug-
gests that the original ‘allows for the possibility that what is like an illness is
not the question but the philosopher’s treatment of it, and even for the possi-
bility that it is the very inclination to talk or conceive of philosophers as
treating questions that is like an illness’. Although I am not persuaded by this
interpretation of §255 because I think it jars with the context within which the
remark appears, one cannot but admire the imaginative dexterity with which
Mulhall subverts ingrained readings of the text, challenging the reader to re-
examine features of Wittgenstein’s work she may have, unwisely, taken for
granted. So whether one agrees with Mulhall or not, his new work reads well,
and certainly deserves close attention.
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Sounds: A Philosophical Theory, by Casey O’Callaghan. Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 2007. Pp. xiii + 193. H/b £30.00.
Sounds have received relatively little philosophical attention, which is surpris-
ing given the significant amount of work done on perception more generally
and vision in particular. No more than a handful of articles have been devoted
to sounds, and O’Callaghan’s is only the second book-length treatment of the
topic by an analytic philosopher, and the first in English (see R. Casati and J.
Dokic, La philosophie du son, Nîmes: Chambon, 1994). Sounds is impressive. It
is carefully argued and well-written. O’Callaghan defends the proposal that
‘particular sounds are events of oscillating or interacting bodies disturbing or
setting a surrounding medium into wave motion’ (p. 60). In addition to pre-
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